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ECTION

8(a)(8) of the National Labor Relations Act makes it an

unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard
to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." 1 The purpose of this section is "to allow employees to freely
exercise their right to join unions, be good, bad, or indifferent members,
2
or abstain from joining any union without imperiling their livelihood."
In accord with this policy the Court has held that to "encourage or
discourage membership" means also to encourage or discourage participation in union activities or fulfillment of union obligations.3
Since almost any employer response to union activity will have a
tendency to encourage or discourage union membership, the development of rules governing application of section 8(a)(3) has necessarily involved an attempt to achieve a compromise between the employee's
interest in freely choosing whether or not to engage in union activity
and the employer's interest in running his business as he sees fit.4 Hence,
the most sensible method of determining whether section 8(a)(3) applies in a given type of case is by balancing the importance of the
employer's interest against the likely degree of encouragement or discouragement of union membership. This approach is widely employed,
and there is considerable language in the opinions stressing its im5
portance.
But like many forms of rational behavior, balancing interests against
one another is easier to subscribe to in theory than it is to put into
practice. It is time consuming and conflicts with the desire that the law
be certain. As a result it is not surprising that balancing of interests is
Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(2)(3) (1958).
2 Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954).
3 Id. at 39-42.
4 See, e.g., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
5 See, e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228-29 (1963); NLRB y.
Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
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often discarded by both the Board and the courts in favor of more objective standards, which would be acceptable if they adequately recognized the interests likely to be affected. 6 But the Board frequently
applies section 8(a)(3) mechanically without considering legitimate employer interests. The courts, on the other hand, have responded by
developing standards which require a finding that section 8(a)(3) was
not violated even where careful weighing of interests would suggest its
application. The purpose of this article is to explore the interplay
between the Board and the courts and to evaluate the standards which
have been developed to govern application of section 8(a)(8).
THE DEFINITION OF DISCRIMINATION

One possible way to limit application of section 8(a)(3) is to construe
the word discrimination narrowly. Several recent judicial opinions have
suggested that an employer does not discriminate unless he treats union
6 Thus both the Board and the courts automatically find a violation when an employer treats union members differently from non-union members. A per se approach
is justifiable in this context. The encouragement or discouragement is direct; any
employee deciding whether to join a union will take the employer's actions into account.
In NLRB v. Gaynor News Co., 197 F.2d 719 (2d Cir. 1952), the employer granted special
benefits to union members which were denied to non-union members. He argued
that he had not violated section 8(a)(3) because his "action had neither the purpose
nor the effect ... to encourage membership in any labor organization." The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected this argument because "discriminatory conduct,
such as that practiced here, is inherently conducive to increased union membership."
Id. at 722. The Supreme Court affirmed on certiorari. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB,
347 U.S. 17 (1954). It specifically approved the per se approach based on disparate
treatment of union members and non-union members. "In holding that a natural
consequence of discrimination, based solely on union membership or lack thereof,
is discouragement or encouragement of membership in such union, the court merely
recognized a fact of common experience-that the desire of employees to unionize is
directly proportional to the advantages thought to be obtained from such action."
Id. at 46. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of a strong employer interest in drawing
such a distinction.
An employee might seek to justify drawing a distinction between union members
and non-union members in several ways. He could argue that having union men and
non-union men working together caused or is likely to cause turmoil in the shop. This
justification was rejected in NLRB v. Star Publishing Co., 97 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1938).
An employer has sufficient power under the act to deal individually with those who
violate rules of discipline. Experience indicates that serious turmoil can be avoided
by a determined employer. Moreover, a certain amount of agitation must necessarily
be tolerated as the price of the free discussion which is essential for free choice.
An employer could argue that he was forced by union or employee pressure to draw
such a distinction. The answer here is that he must resist the pressure by either
disciplining the employees or filing a charge against the union. See NLRB v. Gluek
Brewing Co., 144 F.2d 847 (8th Cir. 1944). An employer might argue that union men are
likely to behave in certain improper ways and that he is justified in taking action
in advance to avoid this. But of course this argument runs counter to the basic purpose
of section 8(a)(3), which seeks to prevent an employer from using his views of unions
and their members as the basis for punishing or rewarding employees.
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members or employees who engaged in union activity differently from
the way he treats other employees. 7 Although such a definition of discrimination is consistent with the common understanding of the term
it is inconsistent with the policy of insulating union activity from reprisals on the job. It would make section 8(a)(3) inapplicable to cases
when retaliation against the union activity of some employees affects all
employees. And it would probably require a court to hold that there was
no violation of section 8(a)(3) when a company applied a rule to union
activity which would also be applied in other situations.
A narrow definition of discrimination was urged on the Court and
rejected in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB. s The employer discharged
an employee for soliciting union membership in violation of a long
standing company rule prohibiting "soliciting of any type."9 The
Board found that the rule as applied to union solicitation constituted
a violation of section 8(a)(1) because it interfered with the right of
self-organization and that the discharge pursuant to the rule violated
section 8(a)(3). The Supreme Court agreed. Since the rule was applied
to all cases, not only those involving union solicitation, the company
argued that there was no discrimination. The Court dealt with this
argument in the following cryptic passage:
Petitioner urges that [it] ... did not violate section 8(3) .. .
because the rule was not discriminatorily applied against union
solicitation but was impartially enforced against all solicitors.
It seems clear, however, that if a rule against solicitation is
invalid as to union solicitation on the employer's premises
during the employee's own time a discharge because of violation of that rule discriminates within the meaning of [section]
8(8), in that it discourages membership in a labor organization.10
The Court's analysis is unclear: to the extent the opinion equates
discrimination with discouragement it denies any separate meaning to
the former. But it is dear that the Court used discrimination to signify
something other than a distinction between employees. The only way
in which it may properly be said that the employer discriminated was
in treating these employees differently from the way he would have
treated them had they not engaged in union solicitation. Discrimination
as thus used includes any employer action taken in response to union
activity.
7 Local 357, Teamsters Union v. NLR.B, 365 U.S. 667, 675 <1961); NLRB v.
Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172, 176 (2d Cir. 1963); NLR.B v. Great Fall Employers'
Council, Inc., 277 F.2d 772, 775 (9th Cir. 1960).
8 a24 U.S. 793 (1945).
9 Id. at 795.
10 Id. at 805.
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The point is illustrated by Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 11 where
the employer reclassified everyone, members and nonmembers alike,
in a unit which voted in favor of a union. The Seventh Circuit held
that the employer violated sections 8(a)(1) and (3)"so long as that
action would not have been taken in the absence of such union activity."' 2 Here too the court correctly construed discrimination to include
employer response to union activity. The policy of insulating employees'
jobs from their union activity or membership usually applies with as
much force to cases of general retaliation as to cases in which the
employer singles out those who engaged in union activity for special
treatment. And the employer's interest does not appear to be any greater.
THE TREATMENT OF DISCRIMINATION BAsED ON UNION

AcnvITY

In cases where discrimination is based on employer response to union
activity the Board has generally determined the applicability of section
8(a)(3) by balancing the importance of the union activity and the extent
of its infringement by the employer' s against the importance of the
employer's interest. The fact that an employer's conduct serves a legitimate business purpose is relevant in two ways. It sets an important
interest in opposition to the interest of free employee choice and makes
it less likely that the action will be construed as a threat to all union
activity. On the other hand it is well settled that if an employer is
motivated by anti-union animus his action violates section 8(a)(3) even
though it serves a valid business purpose and would otherwise have been
4
permissible.'
11 162 F.2d 435 (7th Cir. 1947).
12 Id. at 440. See also Armstrong Cork Co. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 843 (5th Cir. 1954);
NLRB v. Somerset Shoe Co., 111 F.2d 681 (1st Cir. 1940).
13 Relevant factors may include the number of employees involved, the extent to
which the employer's rule is likely to affect a particular kind of union activity, the
nature of the discipline, and the likelihood that the employer's conduct will be seen
as a limited response to particular concerted activity rather than to a general feeling
about unions. To some extent the degree of discouragement which occurs in such
cases turns on whether the employees consider the act of the employer a reflection
of his basic hostility to unions in general.
14 Where the employer is in fact motivated by hostility to unions, a violation is
automatically found. See, e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227-28
(1963); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 111 n.4 (1956); NLRB v.
Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226, 230-33 (1949). If the employer's conduct serves a
legitimate business purpose, the fact is relevant in two ways. First, it sets an important
interest in opposition to the interest of free employee choice, and second, it makes
it less likely that the action will be construed as a threat to all union activity.
The distinction between valid business considerations and anti-union animus is
not always apparent. In NLRB v. Lassing, 284 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1960), an employer

1965]

SECTION 8(a)(8) OF THE NLRA

By and large when the Board has carefully weighed competing interests, the courts have accepted its decisions.1 5 As noted above, where the
Board has failed to consider important interests, the courts have responded
by denying enforcement of the Board's orders without undertaking to
assumed that the presence of the union would lead to increased costs. Partly on the
basis of this conclusion he eliminated three jobs. The Board found a violation of
§ 8(a)(8). The court of appeals denied enforcement on the grounds that: "The advent
of the Union was a new economic factor which necessarily had to be evaluated by the
respondent as a part of the overall picture pertaining to costs of operations ....
There
is no evidence [of] . . . anti-union background ....
The change was made because of
reasonably anticipated increase costs, regardless of whether this increased cost was
caused by the advent of the Union or by some other factor entering into the picture."
Id. at 783.
If this approach were generally followed, the result would be unfortunate. Almost
any conduct which penalizes employees for union membership or activity can be
described in other terms. An employer who discharges employees for joining the
union could claim that his actions were meant to prevent the turmoil which often occurs
when some employees are union men and others are not. Typically, however, such
excuses are not permitted. See cases cited in note 6 supra. In many cases anti-union
animus is based not on political convictions but on an evaluation of what effect
unionization will have on profits, industrial relations, or plant conditions. Neither the
Board nor the courts are equipped to separate the factors which influenced an
employer in order to determine whether he was unhappy with union organization
because of relevant economic considerations or because of an intent to evade the act. It
seems highly unlikely that state of mind is often cast in terms of a pure and simple
desire to violate the act. Nor would it be desirable to permit an employer to take into
account union affiliation to the extent that a court thinks this factor reasonably
related to economic reality. Such a rule would permit the economic views of individual
judges to have significant impact on our labor laws.
15 In Erie Resistor Corp., 132 N.L.R.B. 621 (1961), the Board held that granting
superseniority to strike replacements violated § 8(a)(3). It is well settled that in an
economic strike an employer may, in order to continue operation, hire permanent replacements even if striking employees will have to be laid off. NLRB v. McKay Radio &
Tel. Co., 804 U.S. 333 (1938). The employer in Erie Resistor argued that since superseniority was granted to assure that replacements were available it served the same
legitimate employer interest and therefore should be permitted. The Board recognized
that a legitimate purpose was served, but it carefully pointed out the ways in which
permitting an employer to hire replacements and to grant them superseniority is
more likely to discourage participation in strike activity than merely permitting
replacement. Erie Resistor Corp., supra at 625-30. The Supreme Court affirmed and
adopted the Board's reasoning. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 273 U.S. 221, 230-32 (1963).
See also NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87 (1957) (upholding the Board's
decision in Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954) that the employer's
interest in multi-employer bargaining was worthy of special recognition); Radio
Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954), enforcing, 93 N.L.R.B. 299 (1951), 93
N.L.R.B. 1523 (1951), and 94 N.L.R.B. 1494 (1951); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,
324 U.S. 793 (1945), enforcing, 54 N.L.R.B. 1253; Local 79, Teamsters Union v.
NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), upholding the Board's decision in Redwing
Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962), that the employer's interest in efficient
operation permits an employer to discharge employees who refuse to cross a picket line.
It is interesting to note that in all of these decisions the courts stressed the discretion
given the Board under the Act.
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correct the Board's failure to balance. The extent to which the Board's
approach shapes the courts' response is demonstrated by the cases dealing
with an employer's ability to apply existing company rules to employees
who engaged in union activity. "Where no-solicitation or no-distribution
rules are applied to union activity, the Board carefully weighs the
interest of the union in having its message heard against the amount of
potential interference with efficient operations. 16 Generally the courts
affirm the Board; even if they do not, they undertake to reevaluate the
competing interests.'1 But in cases involving other types of rules which
are logically indistinguishable from the solicitation cases the Board
16 The balancing is directed to the question of whether the company's rule violated
8(a)(1). If the rule violates § 8(a)(1) union solicitation contrary to it is protected
by § 7. In such cases discipline of the employee violates § 8(a)(3). Stoddard-Quirk
Manufacturing Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962); May Department Store Co., 136 N.L.R.B.
797 (1962); Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843-44 (1943).
Application of § 8(a)(3) may involve a similar balancing of interests directed to the
question of whether union activity is protected by Section 7. Thus where an employee
presses a contractual grievance under the established machinery, he is engaged in
protected activity even if the union considers the claim non-meritorious. If he is
discharged for processing his claim the discharge violates 99 8(a)(3) and (1). Farmers
Union Co-op. Marketing Ass'n, 145 N.L.R.B. 1 (1963). But where an individual
presses his own claim outside the grievance machinery he is not engaged in protected
activity and § 8(a)(3) is not violated if he is discharged. R. J. Tower Iron Works, Inc.,
144 N.L.R.B. 445 (1963). The Board draws the distinction because it views the
general employee interest in having the grievance machinery utilized as more
important than the interest in having an individual grievance settled informally. See
Farmers Union Co-op. Marketing Ass'n, supra at 3. Similarly, intermittent work
stoppages to protest an employer's unfair labor practices are protected and a subsequent discharge violates § 8(a)(3). Blades Mfg. Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 561 (1963). But
intermittent work stoppages for the purpose of utilizing bargaining pressure are
unprotected. UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949). The
employer's interest in continuity of operations which makes the conduct unprotected
in a bargaining context is not deemed worthy of protection when the employer is
guilty of violating the act. Blades Mfg. Corp., supra. The same type of balancing is
utilized to determine whether picket line activity loses the protection of the act
because of minor misconduct. Thus in Bonnar Vawter, Inc., 129 N.L.R.B. 127 (1960),
enforced, 289 F.2d 133 (1st Cir. 1961), the Board found that three striking employees
who pretended that they were putting nails in a driveway were engaged in protected
activity. Their discharge was held to be a violation of § 8(a)(3). In Brookville Glove
Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 213 (1955), enforced, 234 F.2d 400 (3d. Cir. 1956), threats of violence
were held sufficient to deprive employees of their right to reinstatement.
17 NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357 (1958); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); Republic Aviation Corp. v. N.L.R.B. 324 U.S. 793 (1945);
NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp. 324 F.2d 128 (2nd Cir. 1963).
In some cases the question is whether an important business interest permits an
employer to penalize employees who engaged in protected union activity. Thus, an
employer may replace economic strikers even permanently in order to keep his
business operating, NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 33 (1938), but he
may not discharge the employees or replace them in order to punish them. NLRB v.
Buzza-Cardoza, 205 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1953). Refusal to cross a picket line is protected
concerted activity, but the employee may be discharged where it is "clear ... that the
employer acted only to preserve ... operation of his business." Redwing Carriers, Inc.,
137 N.L.R.B. 1545, 1547 (1962), petition to set aside denied, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964).

§
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applies section 8(a)(3) mechanically,' 8 and the courts refuse to find a
violation unless it can be shown that the employer acted for the purpose
of discouraging union membership. 19
Typical is Quality Castings Co. v. NLRB. 20 In that case an employer
acted in accordance with a profit sharing plan which provided for forfeiture on the basis of a percentage of unexcused absences during a
particular period. As a result, certain employees who were on strike
during the period did not receive their bonuses. The Board held that
this approach violated the act since it rested on "the faulty premise
that time on strike may lawfully be considered the equivalent of normal
absence for purposes of determining profit-share forfeiture." 21 The
court of appeals reversed:
We are of the opinion that when, as in this case, an employer's
action is not specifically directed against those who have engaged
in protected types of union activity but is rather directed at
a group which is defined by other than union membership or
activity criteria, and which dearly includes others who did
not engage in the protected, concerted activities, the Board not
only must prove discrimination but also it must prove the
employer's motivation.22
Although the emphasis on motive is unfortunate, the result reached
by the court of appeals seems sound. Where the employer applies uniform criteria which predate the particular situation, it makes sense to
18 National Seal Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 661 (1963); Quality Castings Co., 139 N.L.R.B.
928 (1962); Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 855 (1959).
19 NLR.B v. National Seal Co., 336 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1964); Quality Castings Co. v.
NLRB, 325 F.2d 36 (6th Cir. 1963); Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. NLRB, 284
F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1960).
20 336 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1964).
21 139 N.L.R.B. 928, 930 (1962).
22 325 F.2d at 41. See also Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 74
(9th Cir. 1960). In that case the company had a general policy of giving Christmas
bonuses when it could afford to. In 1957 the company by resolution excluded from the
bonus "the striking employees at the Santa Clara Plant." The company argued that
its decision was based upon application of a formula, components of which were
productivity and continuity of work effort at the individual plants. The striking
employees were excluded, the company argued, not because they had gone on strike
but because they did not perform well on these items in the program. The Board
found a violation. It concluded that even if the employer was not improperly
motivated, "the conclusion is inescapable that in applying its five factor formula . . .
respondent discriminated against such employees solely on the basis of their partidpation in a prolonged strike. It is of course obvious that such discriminatory treatment
tends to discourage future strike action by respondent's employees." Pittsburgh-Des
Moines Steel Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 855, 858 (1959). The court of appeals reversed: "When
criteria other than union membership or activity are used as the basis for an employer's
it is then up to the Board to predicate a conclusion of unlawful
discrimination ....
intent upon .. . specific evidence; a showing of the discriminatory treatment plus its
natural and foreseeable consequences will not suffice." 284 F.2d at 83.
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grant him considerable leeway. For in such cases it is likely that whatever
discouragement of union activities occurs will be limited to the particular
activity involved and will not include union membership or activity in
general. There is little reason to believe that the employees will expect
general retaliation against union membership. Moreover, the fact that
the employer applies these standards in situations which do not involve
union activity indicates that there is a legitimate business interest
involved.
An employer should be permitted to withhold the payment of benefits
on the basis of criteria which reflect participation in concerted activity,
particularly where the benefits are in some way attributable to work
which the employee did not perform. An employer may, after all, withhold wages during a strike, and employees know that strike action
involves forfeiture of immediate benefits and the risk of permanent
replacement. The amount of additional discouragement which would
occur were there also the possibility of loss of a bonus or other future
benefits seems minimal, especially since it is possible for this to be taken
into account in the strike settlement.
On the other hand, where the imposition of a penalty is involved the
case for finding a violation is often stronger, particularly if the penalty
will have permanent effect. In such cases the approach taken by the
courts of appeals leads to more questionable results. Thus, in NLRB v.
National Seal,23 an employer dismissed probationary employees who had

participated in a strike on the basis of a long-standing rule that probationary service had to be continuous and unbroken. Without carefully
weighing the competing interests, the Board found a violation of section
8(a)(3). 24 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied enforcement. The result of the court's decision was to deprive all probationary
employees of the right to strike, the special importance of which has
been recognized both by Congress and the courts.25 The employer's
interest was minor, particularly since he could have extended the probationary period to provide the necessary period of continuous service.
The application of such a rule to strike activity seems no less destructive
of statutory rights than application of the no-solicitation rule in the
Republic Aviation case.2 6 Unfortunately neither the Board nor the Ninth
Circuit went beyond generalities in judging the legality of the employer's
conduct.
23
24
25
26

336 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1964).
National Seal Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 661 (1963).
See § 13 of the act; NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 233 (1963).
324 U.S. 793 (1945).
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THE IMPORTANCE OF EMPLOYER MOTIVE

The most frequently used technique for limiting application of section
8(a)(3) has been to require a showing that the employer was motivated
by a desire to discourage union membership. Since the courts have not
insisted upon such a showing when the Board has carefully weighed
competing interests, there exist two lines of cases dealing with section
8(a)(3). In one a finding of violation turns on a finding of improper
motive; 27 in the other it turns on balancing of interests.2 8 This dichotomy
reflects long-standing confusion concerning the relevance of the employer's state of mind to a finding of violation of section 8(a)(3). In part, the
confusion stems from the failure of the courts to recognize that employers
use motive as a defense in two very different ways. The typical 8(a)(3)
case involves the discharge or discipline of an employee active in union
activities. The employer defends on the grounds that the discharge was
not based on union activity, but on poor work or misconduct. In the
second type of case the employer seeks to defend action admittedly
taken in response to union activity on the grounds that it was intended
to serve a proper business purpose.
In the former class of cases a legitimate motive constitutes a valid
defense. Proof of proper motive is also proof that union activity was
not the basis for the employer's actions. It has always been recognized
that union membership does not insulate an employee from discipline.2 9
Although such a discharge may discourage union membership, there is
no discrimination for purposes of section 8(a)(3) since the differentiation
between employees is not related to union activity or membership.
The impact on the union is fortuitous. Such cases were the first dealt
with by the courts, and from the beginning opinions in these cases
have stressed the importance of motive.8 0 In context this is unobjection27 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 800 (1965); Local 357, Teamsters
Union v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961); Quality Castings Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 86 (6th
Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Dalton Brick 8: Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886, 896 (5th Cir. 1962);
Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Great
Falls Employers' Council, Inc., 277 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1960). Even opinions which
stress the necessity for a finding of improper motive recognize an exception for cases
in which the discrimination is based on union membership. See Pittsburgh-Des Moines
Steel Co. v. NLRB, supra; American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, supra.
28 See, e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963); Radio Officers'
Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793
(1945); Summit Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1958); Cusano v. NLRB,
190 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1951); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 162 F.2d 435 (7th Cir.
1947).

29 See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1937).
80 Ibid: "The Act does not interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the
employer to select its employees or to discharge them . . . . The Board is not entitled
to make its authority a pretext for interference with the right of discharge when that
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able. But the courts have often simply assumed the applicability of
this language to cases in which the employer admittedly acts on the
basis of union activity. And although the Supreme Court has upheld
a finding of violation without a finding of improper motive on at least
three occasions, 31 its language has been so highly equivocal that no clear
picture of the significance of motive has emerged.
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB32 was the first case in which application of section 8(a)(3) was upheld by the Court although the employer
was not motivated by hostility to the union. The significance of the
decision has been obscured by the fact that the company acted pursuant
to a rule which has been found to violate section 8(a)(1) 33 and because, as

noted above, the Court's discussion of section 8(a)(3) was short and
confusing.
The first full discussion by the Court of the requirement of motive
under section 8(a)(3) was in Radio Officer's Union v. NLRB, 34 where
the Court held that discharge or refusal to hire an employee for
failure to meet his union obligations constituted a violation of section
8(a)(3). The Court rejected the defense that the employer "did not
intend to discourage." It found that "since .

.

. the employers intended

to discriminate solely on the grounds of such protected union activity
it did not matter that they did not intend to discourage membership."3 5
Unfortunately, once again the basis for the Court's holding was not
made clear. The Court quoted approvingly from statements made in
other contexts concerning the importance of motive.3 6 It avoided the
reach of this language through the conclusion that in certain cases,
"Both the Board and the Court have recognized that proof of certain
types of discrimination satisfies the intent requirement."3 7 This occurs
"where employer conduct inherently encourages or discourages union
membership" and "is partly an application of the common law rule that
38
a man is held to intend the foreseeable consequences of his conduct."
This language was bound to lead to confusion in subsequent cases.
right is exercised for other reasons than . . . intimidation and coercion." See also
Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937).
31 NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963); Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB,
347 U.S. 17 (1954); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
32 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
33 See, e.g., NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1962).
34 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
35 Id. at 46.
36 Id. at 43.
37 Id. at 45.
38 Ibid.
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The Court did not explain what it meant by conduct which "inherently
encourages or discourages union membership" nor did it explain the
basis for the assumption that such conduct inevitably reflects improper
motive. As a result, the Radio Officers' decision has been cited both for
the proposition that a finding of improper motive is necessary under
section 8(a)(3) and for the proposition that it is not.3 9
A step towards clearing up the confusion was taken in NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp.,40 in which the Court upheld the Board's determination
that the grant of superseniority to strike replacements violated section
8(a)(3). The employer argued, inter alia, that as he was not motivated by
a desire to discourage union membership his action was privileged. The
Court rejected this argument in language which suggested that it was
prepared to drop its insistence upon motive in cases involving employer
response to union activity:
[A]s often happens, the employer may counter by claiming that
his actions were taken in the pursuit of legitimate business
ends and that his dominant purpose was not to discriminate
or to invade union rights but to accomplish business objectives
acceptable under the Act.... [-]hatever the claimed overriding
justification may be, [the employer's conduct] ...

carries with it

unavoidable consequences which the employer not only foresaw but which he must have intended. As is not uncommon in
human experience, such situations present a complex of motives
and preferring one motive to another is in reality the far more
delicate task, reflected in part in decisions of this Court, of
weighing the interests of employees in concerted activity against
the interest of the employer in operating his business in a
particular manner and of balancing in the light of the Act
and its policy the intended consequences upon employee rights
against the business ends to be served by the employer's
conduct. This essentially is the teaching of the Court's prior
cases.

. . .41

Although Mr. Justice White, who wrote the opinion in Erie Resistor,
emphasized balancing, he recognized that motive plays an important
role in the balancing process. The basic premise of the opinion is that
existence of a legitimate business purpose, though relevant, is not necessarily dispositive if achieving such purpose would require serious inter39 Compare Local 357, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961), with Miranda
Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 186-87 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir.
1963). See also Mountain Pacific Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc., 119
N.L.R.B. 883, 895 (1957); Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 74 (4th
Cir. 1960).
40

373 U.S. 221 (1963).

41

Id. at 228-30.
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ference with union rights. Moreover, as the opinion makes dear, if an
employer is motivated by anti-union animus his action will be held to
violate section 8(a)(3) even though it serves a valid business purpose
and would otherwise have been permissible. 42
Any hope that Erie Resistor would end the confusion concerning
the requirement of motive ended with the Court's decision in American
Ship Bld. Co. v. NLRB. 43 The Board had found that the employer
violated sections 8(a)(1) and (3) by locking out his employees in order
to apply economic pressure during negotiations for a new contract,
which conforms with the position it has consistently and mechanically
taken that absent special circumstances a bargaining lockout improperly
penalizes employees for engaging in collective bargaining. 44 The Court
42 Id. at 227-28. Justice White suggested that when improper motive is found the
need for balancing interests is over. The reason is that "such proof itself is normally
sufficient to destroy the employer's claim of legitimate business purpose if one is made,
and provides strong support to a finding that there is interference with union rights
or that union membership will be discouraged." In the vast majority of cases this
reasoning is sound. See cases cited note 14 supra. The Court has since held however
that an employer's interest in being able to go out of business is so great that he
does not violate section 8(a)(3) if he goes out of business" completely. This is true even
if he is motivated by dislike for unions and the desire to punish his employees for
joining. Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
The distinction between valid business considerations and anti-union animus is not
always apparent. In NLRB v. Lassing, 284 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1960), an employer
assumed that the presence of the union would lead to increased costs. Partly on the
basis of this conclusion he eliminated three jobs. The Board found a violation of
section 8(a)(3). The Sixth Circuit denied enforcement on the grounds that: "The
advent of the Union was a new economic factor which necessarily had to be evaluated
by the respondent as a part of the overall picture pertaining to costs of operations
- . . There is no evidence [of] . . . anti-union background ....
The change was made
because of reasonably anticipated increase costs, regardless of whether this increased
cost was caused by the advent of the Union or by some other factor entering into
the picture." Id. at 783.
The result would be unfortunate were this approach to be generally followed.
Almost any conduct which penalizes employees for union membership or activity
can be described in other terms. An employer who discharges employees for joining
the union could claim that his actions were meant to prevent the turmoil which
often occurs when some employees are union men and others are not. Typically,
however, such excuses are not permitted. See cases cited in note 6 supra. In many
cases, anti-union animus is based not on political convictions but on an evaluation
of the effect unionization will have on profits, industrial relations, or plant conditions.
Neither the Board nor the courts are equipped to separate the factors which influenced
an employer in order to determine whether he was unhappy with union organization
because of relevant economic considerations or because of an intent to evade the act.
It seems highly unlikely that state of mind is often cast in terms of a pure and simple
desire to violate the act. Nor would it be desirable to permit an employer to take
into account union affiliation to the extent that a court thinks this factor reasonably
related to economic reality. Such a rule would permit the economic views of individual
judges to have significant impact on our labor laws.
43 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
44 Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409 (1950), remanded, 190 F.2d 576 (7th
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of Appeals for the District of Columbia in a short per curiam opinion
granted enforcement. 45 The basis of the decision was that the function
of evaluating "the conflicting legitimate interests .

.

. the Congress com-

mitted primarily to the National Labor Relations Boad .... "43
The Supreme Court reversed. The majority opinion, written by Mr.
Justice Stewart, heavily stressed the importance of motive to a finding
of violation.
To find a violation of § 8(a)(3) then the Board must find that
the employer acted for a proscribed purpose. Indeed, the Board
itself has always recognized that certain "operative" or "economic" purposes would justify a lockout. But the Board has
erred in ruling that only these purposes will remove a lockout
from the ambit of § 8(a)(3), for that section requires an intention to discourage union membership or otherwise discriminate
against the union. There was not the slightest evidence and
there was no finding that the employer was actuated by a
desire to discourage membership in the union as distinguished
from a desire to affect the outcome of the particular negotia47
tions in which he was involved.
The force of this statement was mitigated only slightly by the concession "that there are some practices which are inherently so prejudicial
Cir. 1951); Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1952), enforced, 204 F.2d
529 (7th Cir. 1953); Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 334 (1958); American
Brake Shoe Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 820 (1956), set aside, 244 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1957).
Special circumstances justifying a lockout may be found when there is a threat of a
strike likely to cause "economic losses over and beyond the ordinary loss . . .
attendant upon any strike." 116 N.L.R.B. at 1827, citing Betts Cadillac Oldsmobile,
Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951). Special circumstances also exist when a union seeks
to strike one member of a multi-employer bargaining unit. NLRB v. Brown, 380
US. 278 (1965); NLRB v. Local 44, Teamsters Union, 353 U.S. 87 (1957) (Buffalo
Linen). The Board's conclusion in American Ship Bldg., with respect to §§ 8(a)(1) and
(3) was based partly on the theory that a lockout during negotiations penalizes employees for engaging in collective bargaining, American Brake Shoe Co., supra at 826,
and partly on the theory that it constitutes unreasonable interference with the right
to strike. Id. at 832. The Board apparently was of the view that the right to strike
includes the right to determine the timing of the cessation of operations. See Brief
for Appellee, p. 15, American Ship. Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
Although it did not do so for special reasons in American Ship Bldg., the Board
had routinely held that a bargaining lockout violates § 8(a)(5) on the theory
that "such conduct subjects the Union and the employees it represents to unwarranted
and illegal pressure and creates an atmosphere in which the free opportunity for
negotiation contemplated by section 8(a)(5) does not exist." Quaker State Oil Ref. Co.,
supra at 337.
45 Local 374, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
46 Id. at 840, quoting from NLRB v. Local 449, Teamsters Union, 353 U.S. at 87, 96
(1957).
47 380 U.S. at 313.
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to union interests and so devoid of significant economic justification
that no specific evidence of intent to discourage union membership or
other antiunion animus is required." 48 As examples of such practices
the Court posed situations "where many have broken a shop rule, but
only union leaders have been discharged" and where "an employer
permanently discharged his unionized staff and replaced them with
49
employees known to be possessed of a violent antiunion animus."
The examples are misleading, because it is upon just such facts that
the Board will make a finding of improper motive; it is a rare case
in which the Board has more direct evidence of state of mind. A
further implied concession, that a finding of improper motive is not
necessary where the act complained of has "the natural tendency . . .
severely to discourage union membership while serving no significant
employer interests," 50 is limited by its own terms and by the Court's
subsequent denial to the Board of power to balance "the competing
interests of labor and management." 51
Mr. Justice White, who wrote the opinion in the Erie Resistor case,
concurred specially in American Ship Bldg. on the ground that the
employer had not in fact locked out.52 Had there been a lockout Mr.
Justice White would have voted to affirm on the basis of the Board's
power to balance competing interests under sections 8(a)(1) and (3).
He was particularly unhappy with the renewed insistence upon a
53
finding of improper motive.
Whether the Court will reaffirm American Ship Bldg.'s insistence
Id. at 311.
Id. at 312.
50 Id. at 309.
51 Id. at 312.
52 Id. at 315.
53 "Until today the employer's true motive or sole purpose has not always been
determinative of the impact on employee rights ....
The balance and accomodation
of 'conflicting legitimate interests' in labor relations does not admit of a simple
solution and a myopic focus on the true intent or motive of the employer has not
been the determinative standard of the Board or this Court. . . . The test is clearly
one of choosing among several motivations or purposes and weighing the respective
interests of employers and employees." Id. at 324-26. Mr. Justice Goldberg and the
Chief Justice concurred on the grounds that if "this employer locked out his
employees in the face of a threatened strike under circumstances where the choice
of timing been left solely to the unions, the employer and his customers would have
been subject to economic injury over and beyond the loss of business normally
incident to a strike ....
IId. at 377. Justice Goldberg objected to the Court's emphasis
on motive and to its rejection of the balancing of interests test for application of
§ 8(a)(1) and (3). In his view, had a proper approach based on balancing of interests
been employed, the Court would not have been able to state a rule to cover all
bargaining lockouts since the "types of situation in which an employer might seek
to lock out his employees differ considerably one from the other." Id. at 336-37.
48
49
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upon motive is difficult to assess. Employers will undoubtedly urge its
application in a variety of situations. They are most likely to contend
that they may employ bargaining lockouts even before impasse is
reached and also that during the course of the lockout they may hire
permanent replacements. Such action might be undertaken without an
"intention to discourage union membership or otherwise discriminate
against the union," and even if the employer's conduct might be said to
"severely discourage union membership" it could not be said to serve
"no significant employer interest." According to the language of the
majority opinion both factors must be present in order to "truncate
... inquiry into employer motivation." 54 Thus it is fair for Mr. Justice
White to comment: "If the Court means what it says today, an employer
may not only lock out after impasse consistent with §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3),
but replace his locked-out employees with temporary help ... or perhaps
permanent replacements, and also lock out long before an impasse is
reached." 55
But there is reason to doubt that the language of American Ship
Bldg. offers a safe guide to the Court's future decisions. Not only
did three members of the Court specifically disassociate themselves from
Mr. Justice Stewart's reasoning, but in NLRB v. Brown,56 decided the
same day, the approach was markedly different. The Court there decided
that an employer who legitimately locked out his employees to prevent
whip-sawing by the union could hire temporary replacements in order
to operate during the lockout period. The Board had held that although
the lockout was privileged, the employer had violated sections 8(a)(1)
and (3) by hiring replacements in order to stay open during the lockout. The Supreme Court reversed, but it did so only after carefully
weighing the likelihood of harm to the union against the employer's
interest in maintaining operations during this period. Mr. Justice
Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion in NLRB v. Brown, recognized
that a violation of section 8(a)(3) might be proved either by weighing
these competing interests or by showing that the conduct had as its
purpose the discouragement of union activity or membership. It is only
54

Id. at 312.

55 Id. at 324. The Court's original grant of certiorari was limited to the question
"whether, under section 8(d)(4), an employer lockout is a corollary of the employees'
statutory right to strike?" 379 U.S. 814 (1964). It might be argued that since this
question must have been answered affirmatively, a lockout is permissible whenever a
strike would be and that the employer may take whatever steps he might legitimately
take during a strike. But none of the opinions refer to this limitation. The specific
question for which certiorari was granted is not referred to and the final statement by
the Court of its holding is quite narrow. 380 U.S. at 318. Accordingly, not too much
should be made of the limitation on the grant of certiorari.

56 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
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when the balancing process is resolved in the employer's favor that
improper motive becomes an absolute requirement. 57 This approach
is consistent with the Court's prior decisions, including NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp.,58 where Mr. Justice White pointed out that improper
motive will turn otherwise legitimate conduct into a violation of section
8(a)(3). Thus it is very possible that in a case where the employer's conduct is more likely to be destructive of statutory rights the Court,
particularly if the Board carefully weighs the competing interests, will
ignore the broad language of American Ship Bldg.
There is no reason why an employer who penalizes his employees
for engaging in union activity should be exonerated solely because he
was not motivated by the desire to discourage union membership or
activity. Where union activity provides the basis for the employer's
conduct he cannot claim that his action was taken without regard to
its impact on the union.59 Even if other objectives are uppermost in
his mind, penalizing employees for union activity is recognized as the
way to achieve these objectives. Although the employer may even regret
his interference with the employee's right to engage in union activity,
he has nonetheless concluded that his own interests are more important.
If statutory rights are to be adequately protected this conclusion cannot
be left to the discretion of the employer. The determination of whether
the employer's interest is sufficient to justify the interference with
employee freedom of action should be made by the Board with active
supervision by the courts.
Furthermore the Board's approach to bargaining lockouts in American
Ship Bldg. and other cases had not reflected the careful balancing of interests contemplated by the Erie Resistor decision; it had been doctrinaire, conceptualistic, and in need of correction by the Court. 60 The

Board's approach rested in part on the often stated assumption that
"such conduct subjects the union and the employees they represent to
unwarranted and illegal pressure and creates an atmosphere in which
the free opportunity for negotiation contemplated by section 8(a)(5)
57 "When the resulting harm to employee rights is thus comparatively slight, and
a substantial and legitimate business end is served, the employers' conduct is prima
fade lawful. Under these circumstances the finding of an unfair labor practice under
§ 8(a)(3) requires a showing of improper subjective intent." Id. at 289. Mr. Justice
White dissented.

58 373 U.S. 221 (1963).

59 Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 45 (1954): "[A~n employer's protestation that he did not intend to encourage or discourage must be unavailing where a
natural consequence of his action was such encouragement or discouragement."
60 See Meltzer, Single Employer and Multi-Employer Lockouts Under the TaftHartley Act, 24 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 70 (1956).
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62
does not exist." 61 But as courts and commentators have pointed out,

this conclusion is directly contrary to the Supreme Court's opinion in
NLRB v. Insurance Agents. 63 There the Court stated: "The presence
of economic weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on occasion
by the parties is part and parcel of the system that the Wagner and
Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized," 64 and "the use of economic pressure
by the parties to a labor dispute is not a grudging exception to some
policy of completely academic discussion enjoined by the Act; it is part
and parcel of the process of collective bargaining." 65 The Board in
balancing the competing interests of employers and unions under section
8(a)(3) had failed to accept the Court's conclusion that collective bargaining works best where the parties are free to use economic pressure.
Considerable weight should have been given to the employer's interest
in applying pressure in support of his bargaining position. The Board
had failed to even consider it.
Moreover, the amount of discouragement may be small when a bargaining lockout is employed, particularly where the union and employer
have had bargaining relations over a period of years. In such cases it
is generally understood that the employer accepts the union and is willing
to work with it. The impact, if any, of the employer's action is more
likely to be on the union's bargaining position than on the allegiance
of the employees to the union. Indeed, it is very possible that the reaction
to a lockout will be one not of fear, but of anger, strengthening instead
of loosening employee bonds with the union.
In the American Ship Bldg. Co. case the employer had a long history
of engaging in collective bargaining with a group of eight unions. He
had bargained in good faith with the union until an impasse was reached
in the current negotiations. He was concerned about the possibility of
a strike during the winter months when he "would be more vulnerable."
On five preceding occasions contract negotiations were threatened by a
strike. It is clear that on balance the employer's interest out-weighed the
relatively slight amount of discouragement which probably resulted
from his action, and that the result reached by the court was sound.
61 Quaker State Oil Ref. Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 334, 337 (1958). See also Dalton Brick
& Tile Corp., 126 N.L.R.B. 473, 485 (1960) (and cases cited therein), enforcement
denied, 301 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1962).
62 See, e.g., Meltzer, Lockouts Under the LMRA: New Shadows on an Old Terrain,
28 U. CHI. L. REv. 614, 619-21 (1961); NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., 301 F.2d

886 (5th Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Great Falls Employers' Council, 277 F.2d 772 (9th
Cir. 1960).
63 361 U.S. 477 (1959).
64 Id.
65 Id.

at 489.
at 495.
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But the answer in the American Ship Bldg. case does not necessarily
apply to all lockout situations. As Mr. Justice Goldberg pointed out, the
balance might well be different in another case. For example, in many
cases the impact of a bargaining lockout would be disastrous for the
union. Where a new union is too weak to strike, an employer lockout
might bankrupt the union treasury and seriously affect the allegiance
of employees by demonstrating the weakness of the union. Even if done
only for bargaining purposes, a lockout in such circumstances would
probably carry a flavor of employer reprisal. However, there is no need
for a per se approach in either case. 66 Rather, the Board should be required to consider the strength of the union, the history of the bargaining relationship, the nature of the negotiation and the likelihood that
the union would have struck.
THE RIGHT

To Go

OUT OF BUSINESS

Another instance in which both the Board and the courts failed to
weigh competing interests carefully is Textile Workers v. Darlington
Mfg. Co.06 7 The case, which dealt with an employer's ability to go out
of business for anti-union reasons, arose when in September, 1956, the
employees of Darlington Manufacturing Company voted for union
representation. In response the stockholders voted to dissolve the corporation. Darlington discontinued operations in November and sold the
plant machinery at auction on December 12, 1956. The Board found
that Darlington thereby violated section 8(a)(3). 68 The Board's analysis
proceeded solely in terms of the impact on statutory rights. No consideration was given to the importance of the employer's interest in being
able to choose freely to go out of business.69
The Board ordered Darlington to refrain from such activities, to
offer reinstatement to the employees if it ever resumed operations, and
66 Although a case by case appraisal would make prediction difficult, it would
not be without compensations. Since the impact on employees, on the union and on
industrial relations is often quite severe, it is desirable that employers be hesitant
about locking out.
67 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
68 Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241 (1962).
69 "As noted above, a partial effectuation of Darlington's threat, such as a temporary
dosing of the mill, or a discharge of some but not all of the employees would have
violated § 8(a)(3). Yet Darlington would have this Board find that total effectuation of
the threat-the permanent closing of its mill with the concomitant discharge of all
its personnel-did not violate the act. In other words, under Darlington's contention
an employer with a staff of 100 employees violates section 8(a)(3) if he discriminatorily
fires 50 or 75 or even 99 of his 100 workers, or if he temporarily lays off all of them,
but, if -he retaliates against them for their union activities by permanently discharging
all of them, the finality of his conduct would make it lawful. The argument is selfdefeating." Id. at 251.
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to provide "backpay until the discharged employees are able to obtain
substantially equivalent employment." 70 The Board also found that
Darlington "occupied a single employer status with [another respondent],
Deering Milliken and its affiliated corporations." 71 A separate order was
directed to Deering Milliken making it liable for backpay to the same
extent as Darlington and ordering it to offer the discharged employees
positions at other locations to the extent they were available. The Fifth
72
Circuit, sitting en banc, denied enforcement.
The Supreme Court remanded. It stated that if Darlington should
be regarded as a single employer it was privileged to go out of business
even if "the liquidation [was] motivated by vindictiveness towards the
union ....- 73 On the other hand the Court held that the dosing down
of the Darlington Plant might constitute an unfair labor practice because
of its impact on other parts of Deering Milliken's enterprise. It announced a three-step test for determining whether a plant closing violates
section 8(a)(3):
If the persons exercising control over a plant that is being
closed for anti-union reasons (1) have an interest in another
business, whether or not affiliated with or engaged in the same
line of commercial activity as the closed plant, of sufficient
substantiality to give promise of their reaping a benefit from
the discouragement of unionization in that business; (2) act to
dose their plant with the purpose of producing such a result;
and (3) occupy a relationship to the other business which makes
it realistically foreseeable that its employees will fear that such
business will also be closed down if they persist in organizational
activities, we think that an unfair labor practice has been
made out.74
The case was returned to the court of appeals to consider whether
Darlington was a single employer under the newly-established test.
The DarlingtonRule and the Rights of a Single Employer
It is easy to understand the Court's concern in the case of a single
employer. It smacks of dictatorship to force a man to stay in business
against his will. As the Court stated, "A proposition that a single businessman cannot choose to go out of business if he wants to would
represent . . . a startling innovation." 75 It thus concluded that an
139 N.L.R.B. at 255.
Ibid.
72 Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 682, 685 (5th Cir. 1963).
73 380 U.S. at 274.
74 Id. at 275-76.
75 Id. at 270.
70
71
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employer has "the absolute right to terminate his entire business for
76
any reason he pleases."
The word "right" is misleading when used to assert that an employer
should be permitted to go out of business for anti-union reasons. It
suggests not only that the act should be permitted but that no unpleasant
legal consequences be attached to its exercise. Yet the conclusion that
an employer should not be forced to stay in business against his will
does not require the further conclusion that his conduct in closing
down is outside the scope of the Act. It means only that the Board
is precluded from applying certain remedies, such as an order to reopen,
to correct the violation. The Board did not order Darlington to
reopen, but only to compensate its employees for their losses.
Mr. Justice Harlan suggested that a complete shutdown does not
contravene the policies of the act:
One of the purposes of the Labor Relations Act is to prohibit
the discriminatory use of economic weapons in an effort to
obtain future benefits. The discriminatory lockout designed
to destroy a union, like a 'runaway shop,' is a lever which has
been used to discourage collective employee activities in the
future. But a complete liquidation of a business yields no such
future benefit for the employer, if the termination is bona fide.
It may be motivated more by spite against the union than by
business reasons, but it is not the type of discrimination which
is prohibited by the Act. The personal satisfaction that such
an employer may derive from standing on his beliefs and the
mere possibility that other employers will follow his example
are surely too remote to be considered dangers at which the
77
labor statutes were aimed.
His reasoning is unconvincing. The impact upon other employees may
be remote, but the impact upon the employees involved is direct, total,
and precisely the sort of danger "at which the labor statutes were
aimed." The employees of Darlington lost their jobs because they
joined and voted for the union. The policy of insulating an employee's
job rights from his decision whether to join a union 7s is contravened
whether or not the employer seeks future gain. The employer acted
because he did not accept the policy of free choice expressed in the
act. It is cold comfort to the employees to know that the employer was
not seeking personal gain but was motivated only by spite and opposition to the exercise of statutory rights.
The Court's concern with future gain can be explained only as a
76
77
78

Id. at 268.
Id. at 271-72.
See note 2 supra.
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way of limiting the right to shut down to those cases in which the
employer acts from a deep sense of commitment and is not merely
employing a labor relations tactic. When an employer operates a single
business the time, energy, emotion and money which have been invested
generally ensure that he will not give it up easily. Implicit in the
Court's language and in the test it states is the notion that the right
to go out of business exists as a safety valve for those people who feel
so strongly that they are willing to substantially impair their own
economic status in order to avoid dealing with a union. Paradoxically,
while the Court establishes a test requiring the employer to pay a price
for getting rid of a union, it does not permit the Board to add to the
cost by requiring compensation for employees who are injured thereby.
To require an employer to compensate his employees would reduce to
a minimum the number of cases in which the safety valve is used and
would afford a degree of protection to those damaged by its exercise.
There is no reason why our labor policy should not be aimed at
discouraging people from going out of business as a way of punishing
employees for union affiliation. It may be that in some cases the Board's
order would be so severe as to amount to an order to stay in business,
but that danger can be met by correcting the order in the particular
case. Such a possibility does not require a rule that in all cases employers
may go out of business to punish his employees and may thereafter
stand indifferent to the hardship caused them.
The DarlingtonRule and PartialClosing
The Court's surprising failure to consider the interests of the employees
directly affected colors its approach to the problem of a partial closing.
The test announced apparently requires the Board to examine the
employer's motives to determine whether he was acting solely out of
anger towards employees who had voted for the union or whether he
was motivated by a desire to chill unionism in other plants.
The clear implication of Darlington is that section 8(a)(3) is concerned with those who observe the employer's conduct but not with
those directly affected. There is even less reason for such an approach
in the case of a partial shutdown than in the case of a complete shutdown by a single employer. The element of cost to the employer who
is only partially closing down is much less since he remains in business
and is able to use the capital made available from closing down one
part to expand the others. Whatever the employer's motiye, there is
likely to be some coercive effect on employees in other parts of the
business. But the Court requires more than the mere likelihood of
coercion: it also requires that the coercion be intended.
Moreover, the Darlington test is unrealistic. It presupposes that the
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Board is capable of sifting motives to determine whether the employer's
state of mind was directed to the particular employees affected or to
the employees at other plants. It is unlikely that the employer made
such a distinction and even more unlikely that the Board could determine whether he did or not.
It is probable that the Court's test will be truncated where it is obvious
that the shutdown plant is part of a larger enterprise. If the Board
finds a coercive effect in the remaining parts of the business it is likely
to assume that the effect was intended by the employer. The Court has
often stated that it is proper under section 8(a)(3) to presume an
employer intended the natural consequences of his act.79 In view of
the difficulty of sorting motives in such a case, it is unlikely that the
Court will demand more. Furthermore, the Board is likely to conclude
that any time an employer has a publicly known interest in a plant
which is shut down for anti-union reasons, it is reasonable to assume
that employees in other parts of the enterprise would be put in fear
that such business will also be dosed down. To require more definite
evidence of coercion would be to make unrealistic demands upon the
Board's fact-finding processes. Thus in many situations it should be
permissible for the Board to assume that employees at one plant will
be coerced by an anti-union shutdown at another, and, as a result, to
make the further finding that the employer so intended. If this comes
about, the test stated by the Court will in fact be reduced to the question of whether it is proper for the Board to find that the shutdown
plant was part of a larger enterprise.
This of course will not always be an easy question. When the issue
is cloudy, the first and third tests announced by the Court offer a useful
approach for resolving this question. But the language of the opinion
suggests that specific findings as to "purpose and effect" are required even
where it is clear that the plant closed down is part of a larger enterprise.
Such a requirement is unnecessary and unrealistic.
THE RELATION BETWEEN SECTION

8(a)(3)

AND SECTION

8(a)(1)

The extent to which the Court's current concern with motive will
affect the policy of protecting free employee choice will depend in part
upon the extent to which the Board is able to find independent violations of section 8(a)(1)s where it cannot find a violation of section 8(a)(3).
Section 8(a)(1) is violated whenever there is "interference" with a
79 NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 287 (1965); Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S.
17, 52 (1954).
S0 "Sec. 8(a). It shall be an unfair labor for an employer-(l) to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7."
49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1) (1958).
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section 7 right. There is no need to show discrimination or encouragement, and it has long been recognized that improper state of mind is
not necessary to a finding of violation. 8' Section 8(a)(1)'s range is so
great and its language so broad that a violation of any of the other
subsections also violates section 8(a)(1); 8

2

it incorporates

all of the

rights against employers granted by the act. Conceivably the Board
could proceed under section 8(a)(1) in any case in which a violation
of section 8(a)(3) is not dear.
The Board sometimes uses 8(a)(1) in place of 8(a)(3).83 It is likely that
this approach will be continued and expanded. It was given great
impetus by the recent Supreme Court decision in Burnup & Sims,
Inc. v. NLRB.8 4 The employer in that case discharged an employee who
was soliciting for the union because the employer mistakenly thought
the employee had threatened to dynamite the employer's property. The
Board held the discharge a violation of sections 8(a)(1) and (3).85 The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement, finding that
the General Counsel had failed to show that the discrimination was
"motivated by a desire to discourage protected activity."8 6
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and upheld the
Board, but found it "unnecessary to reach the questions which were
raised under section 8(a)(3)." It concluded that the employer had
"plainly violated section 8(a)(1) whatever the employer's motive."8 The
Court's reasoning was simple. Discharge of a union solicitor interferes
with union organization. Section 8(a)(1) proscribes interference with
81 Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLR.B, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
82 See NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426 (1941).
83 If there is no labor organization involved, § 8(a)(3) by its own terms is inapplicable and § 8(a)(1) must be used. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum, 370 U.S. 9 (1962);
Sherry Mfg. Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 739 (1960). The Board, however, has also relied on
§ 8(a)(1) in cases where a labor organization was involved. Thus in Gibbs Corp., 124
N.L.R.B. 1320 (1959), the Board held that discharge of a union steward for presenting
grievances was a violation of § 8(a)(1) as interference with protected activity. The
Board found it "unnecessary to decide whether the company's conduct was also violative of § 8(a)(3)." 124 N.L.R.B. at 1321. The Board often employs § 8(a)(3) in such
cases; see, e.g., Farmer's Union Co-op. Marketing Ass'n, 145 N.L.R.B. 1 (1963).
84 379 U.S. 21 (1964).
85 137 N.L.R.B. 766 (1962). The Board's position that a good faith belief that an
employee engaged in concerted activity was guilty of misconduct was not a defense to
§ 8(a)(3) charge had previously been affirmed in NLRB v. Industrial Cotton Mills,
208 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935, and in NLRB v. Cambria Clay
Products Co., 215 F.2d 48 (6th Cir. 1954). It had been rejected in Rubin Bros. Footwear Inc. v. NLRB, 203 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1953).
86 322 F.2d 57, 60 (1963).
87

379 U.S. at 22.
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concerted activity, and its application "does not necessarily depend on
the existence of anti-union bias."88
Although the opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas purported to deal only
with cases of mistaken belief by the employer the reasoning would be
equally pertinent in many cases in which applicability of section
8(a)(3) is in doubt. Inevitably the Board will seek to take advantage of
this technique and the question will be raised whether it is always
appropriate to proceed independently under section 8(a)(1).
The roots of this problem go back to the original conception of the
relationship between the subsections. Section 8(1) was thought of as
the "generic" unfair labor practice and the other subsections as "species" thereof.8 9 This point is dearly made in the House Committee
Report on the Wagner Act.
The succeeding unfair labor practices are intended to amplify
and state more specifically certain types of interference and
restraint that experience has proved require such amplification
and specification. These specific practices, as enumerated in
subsections (2), (3), (4) and (5) are not intended to limit in
any way the interpretation of the general provisions of subsection (1).90
This statement contained the seeds of future confusion. To the
extent that general language is given focus and specificity, its meaning is
necessarily limited. It was inevitable that the language of the subsections would take on independent significance and that separate tests
would be developed for section 8(a)(1) and the other subsections. Certain classes of cases were analysed exclusively in terms of the language
of one of the other subsections, and although a violation of section
8(a)(1) was always found when one of the other subsections was violated
such a finding was dependent upon the finding of a violation of another
subsection. 91 Implicit in this development was the conclusion that in
many situations section 8(a)(1) should not be applied without consideration of the other subsections. What constitutes "interference" with
section 7 rights was to be determined by the policies and language of
the other sections.
This is best illustrated by the cases dealing with the employer's
bargaining obligation. Generally, it is necessary to show that an employer
was improperly motivated in order to establish a refusal to bargain
88 Id. at 23.

89 Art Metals Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 110 F.2d 148, 150 (2d Cir. 1940).
90 H.R. Rzp. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1935). See also S. REP. No. 573, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1935).
91 See, e.g., NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426 (1941).
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collectively under section 8(a)(5). If the improper motive is not present,
there is no violation of the act and no reference is made to the language
of section 8(a)(1). Thus the Supreme Court held in NLRB v. American
Nat'l Ins. Co. 92 that an employer willing to come to an agreement did not violate section 8(a)(5) by insisting that certain matters
normally coming within the scope of the employer's bargaining obligation should be under the unilateral control of management. The Court
did not attempt to determine whether the employer's conduct "interfered" with section 7 rights, despite Mr. Justice Douglas' point in
Burnup & Sims that where section 8(a)(1) is applied independently.
93
"interference" may occur "despite the employer's good faith." Implicit
in this and other decisions construing section 8(a)(5) is the assumption
that where in a bargaining context an employer does not violate his
duty to bargain collectively under section 8(a)(5) he does not interfere
with rights protected by section 7.
Similarly, whether an employer gave improper assistance to a union
is analysed under section 8(a)(2) and it is found that section 8(a)(2)
does not apply there is no independent analysis of the applicability of
section 8(a)(1).

94

In the same way many of the decisions construing section 8(a)(3)
reflect the assumption that the employer conduct involved does not
violate the Act if it does not violate section 8(a)(3). 95 This assumption
was made explicit in the Darlington decision, in which Mr. Justice
Harlan stated that "some employer decisions . . . would never constitute
violations of section 8(a)(1) ... unless they also violated section 8(a)(3)." 9 6

However, the Court has never really addressed itself to the distinction
between conduct which may constitute an independent violation of
section 8(a)(1) and that which should be viewed as permissible if not
within the proscription of section 8(a)(3).
343 U.S. 395 (1952).
379 U.S. at 23.
94 See, e.g., Note, Section 8(aX2): Employees' Assistance to Plant Unions and Committees, 9 STAN. L. R~v. 351 (1957).
95 In Local 357, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961), the Court rejected the Board's conclusion that employers who entered into a hiring hall arrangement with a union, absent specified safeguards, violated §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3). The
Court's analysis was entirely in terms of the language of § 8(a)(3), giving no independent attention to § 8(a)(1). Similarly, in NLRB v. Local 449, Teamsters Union, 353
U.S. 87 (1959), the Court affirmed the legality of a lockout to prevent whipsawing in
a multi-employer situation. The Court considered §§ 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1) together. In
NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1962), the court utilized
the same test previously applied for purposes of § 8(a)(3) in order to determine that
the employer did not violate § 8(a)(1). Cf. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172
(2d Cir. 1963).
96 380 U.S. at 269.
92

93
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The decisions are not nearly as definite in assigning an independent
role to section 8(a)(3) as they are with sections 8(a)(2) and (5).
They reflect great confusion as to the relationship between sections
8(a)(1) and (3) and also as to the tests to be applied under both subsections. Many recent opinions treat them as completely independent
subsections each of which might be applicable in a given case. Thus in
the recent lockout decisions the Court in each case first determined
that section 8(a)(1) was inapplicable and then proceeded to evaluate the
employer's conduct under section 8(a)(3). 97 There was considerable
overlap in the tests employed under each subsection.
The tests traditionally applied to determine applicability of section
8(a)(1) are quite similar to those described by Mr. Justice White in Erie
Resistor as determinative under section 8(a)(3). It might thus be said that
the Court's present approach of independent analysis under each subsection, even if inelegant, is likely to lead to sound results. Undue insistence on motive under section 8(a)(3) is made harmless by independent
balancing of interest under section 8(a)(1). The result in the Burnup
& Sims case was sound and it doesn't really matter what subsection was
employed. 98
So long as the role of motive is confused under section 8(a)(3) separate
analysis under section 8(a)(1) will have much to commend it. But this
is only a stop gap solution. For one thing the court has indicated that
independent analysis under section 8(a)(1) is not always available. And
it is likely that increased use by the Board of section 8(a)(1) will be
offset by curtailment of its independent application by the Court.
Moreover, since the Court's emphasis on motive under section 8(a)(3)
reflects in part a deliberate policy decision and since section 8(a)(1) in
particular situations tends to take on the limitations of the other
subsections it is not at all unlikely that the Court will begin to require
a finding of improper motive under section 8(a)(1). There are signs
of this development in the lockout decisions. 99 Such a development
97 Theoretically the determination that § 8(a)(1) was not violated included the
determination that none of the other subsections of 8(a) was violated. Cf. NLRB v.
Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426 (1941); Art Metals Const. Co. v. NLRB, 110 F.2d
148 (2d Cir. 1940).

98 In terms of weighing interests this was a fairly easy case. The employer interest
in being able to discharge employees on the basis of a mistake in fact is not particularly strong. On the other hand, to permit such a discharge would substantially discourage employee participation in union activity because the employer must not only
act properly but must appear to the employee to be doing so. That employers unhappy
with union activity are prone to find misconduct where none exists is not surprising.
Misconduct affords a basis for discharge and in labor relations as elsewhere "the wish
is often father to the thought."
99 Thus in American Ship Bldg., the Court in its discussion of § 8(a)(1) comes
close to requiring a finding of improper motive. 380 U.S. 300, 308-11 (1965). See also
NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886, 898 (5th Cir. 1962).
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would be particularly unfortunate because it would add confusion to
cases now properly dealt with independently under section 8(a)(1).
Although the tests are similar they are not identical. Analysis under
section 8(a)(3) is more likely to be directed to whether the employer's
conduct had the effect of discouraging union membership while under
section 8(a)(1) it is directed to whether the employer's conduct thwarted
a legitimate union interest. 0 0 Since the language of section 8(a)(1) is
broader than that of section 8(a)(3) it is easier to extend it to new or
borderline cases. Moreover, even if the tests were identical confusion
would be bound to result from the use of different language to describe
the same process under different subsections. Prospects for the orderly
and coherent development of the act would be improved if rules concerning the legality of specific types of behavior were articulated within
the framework of specific subsections. The cases could be most easily
harmonized and future developments made more rational if the rule
were adopted that employer conduct affecting a change in hire, wages
or working conditions, in response to union activity, does not violate
1 1
section 8(a)(1) if it does not violate section 8(a)(3) or section 8(a)(5). 0
EMPLOYER ACTION CAUSED BY THE UNION

If employees are to be free to choose whether or not to take part in
union activity they must be protected against unions as well as employers.
Section 8(b)(2) of the act makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to
"cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection 8(a)(3) .... " Where a union causes an
employer to take action which would violate section 8(a)(3) if the employer acted on his own there is no doubt that sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2)
are violated. The question which must be dealt with is whether the union
caused conduct might be held to violate sections 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3)
even where there would be no violation had the employer acted on his
own.
Almost any employer action taken at the behest of a union comes
within the literal definition of section 8(a)(3). There is discrimination
because the employees are treated differently from the way they would
have been treated in the absence of union activity. And such action will
encourage union membership to the extent that employees learn that
the union is capable of affecting the employer's conduct. The encouragement results whether or not the union is motivated by considerations of
100 See NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
101 Employees may engage in protected activity without a union being on the scene.
If the employer retaliates against them for such activity it is hard to make out a violation of § 8(a)(3). In such cases § 8(a)(1) is employed but the tests used are the same as
when § 8(a)(3) is used. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962); Sherry
Mfg.Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 739 (1960).
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union membership or concerted activity. In the Radio Officers' case the
Supreme Court stated "encouragement to union membership is obviously
a natural and foreseeable consequence of any employer discrimination
10 2
at the request of the union."'
Encouragement of this type was made the base for a finding of violation
in Pacific Intermountain Express Company. 0 3 The Board there held
that a contract clause which delegated to the union control over seniority violated sections 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3) because it was likely to encourage
union membership. The Board concluded that employees would be
coerced by the knowledge that the union had control over their jobs.
This decision caused much alarm among union lawyers. A union
which is a bargaining representative is constantly in the position where
it seeks to influence the employer's conduct. This is particularly true in
processing grievances and in advancing bargaining demands. If the union
is successful it will demonstrate its power over working conditions and
will thereby motivate people towards membership and closer affiliation
with the union leadership. Thus, many legitimate union activities
could be held to violate sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) under the rationale
of the Pacific IntermountainExpress decision. The Board faced this problem in the Mountain Pacific case, 10 4 which posed the question of the
legality of union operated exclusive hiring halls. Obviously if hiring
is done exclusively through the union this fact will demonstrate the
power of the union. On the other hand such halls serve a legitimate
function and they have a long tradition. The Board recognized that
"there are many literal forms of encouragement to union membership
that are not prohibited," and that "a line must be drawn between lawful
and unlawful encouragement."' 10 5 The Board concluded that where
Congress had not specifically spelled out what constituted unlawful discouragement it was for the Board to do so. The Board did not outlaw
all hiring halls. Instead it drew a line in terms of the amount of unfettered control which the union was given in the hiring hall arrangement.106
102 347 U.S. 17, 52 (1954). The opinion is ambiguous with respect to its use of the
term discrimination. There is language which suggests that the court viewed any
differentiation between employees as discrimination. Id. at 39. And there is also
language which suggests that the differentiation must be related to union activity. Id.
at 44.
103 107 N.L.R.B. 838 (1954).
104 Mountain Pacific Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B.
883 (1957).
105 Id. at 897-98. The Board did not deal with the meaning of discrimination.
106 In order to be lawful a hiring hail agreement had to provide: (a) that selection
of applicants would be without regard to union membership; (b) that the employer had
the right to reject any applicant; (c) that the parties would post the provisions of the
agreement in the hiring hall and elsewhere. Id. at 897.
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The Board's Mountain Pacific doctrine was rejected by the Supreme
Court in Local 357, Teamsters v. NLRB.10 T In that case the hiring hall
arrangement did not have the safeguards required by the Board although the contract did have a clause stating that a referral was to be
"irrespective of whether the employee is or is not a member."' 08 The
Supreme Court refused to enforce the Board's decision on the grounds
that the Board could not properly find discrimination:
But surely discrimination cannot be inferred from the face of
the instrument when the instrument specifically provides that
there will be no discrimination .... It may be that the very
existence of the hiring hall encourages union membership. We
may assume that it does. The very existence of the union has the
same influence. When a union engages in collective bargaining
and obtains increased wages and improved working conditions
its prestige doubtless rises and one may assume more workers
are drawn to it .... The truth is that the union is a service
agency that probably encourages membership whenever it does
a job well. But as we said, Radio Officers' v. NLRB, the only
encouragement or discouragement to the union membership
banned by the act is that which is accomplished by discrimination ....109
The opinion is unsatisfactory. For one thing, the Court seemed unaware
that the Board found discrimination of a different type than that- referred to by the agreement. The opinion implies that discrimination as
used in section 8(a)(3) refers only to different treatment of union members and nonunion members. As noted above, this is inconsistent with
the Court's previous decisions. The Court also seemed unaware of the
Board's efforts to distinguish between unlawful encouragement and
lawful encouragement.
There were real problems presented by the Mountain Pacific decision.
The Board may well have exceeded its statutory authority in undertaking to distinguish between lawful and unlawful discouragements.
And its conclusion that arbitrary union power of so traditional a nature
constitutes unlawful encouragement is highly arguable.1 0 But the decision in the Local 357 case fails to come to grips with these problems
107

365 U.S. 667 (1961).

108 Id.

at 668.
675-76.

109 Id. at

110 I have discussed the operation of -union hiring halls with many business agents
for Building Trade unions. They generally admit freely that union considerations
affect their referral policies. Almost invariably they concede that such favoritism was
made more difficult during the lifetime of the Mountain Pacific doctrine and surprisingly most of them think the doctrine was fair.
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and as a result it has been difficult to apply in subsequent cases."' In
Miranda Fuel Co.,1 2 the Board was faced with interpreting its relevance
in a case where a union improperly caused an employer to reduce an
employee's seniority. The Board found a violation, reaffirming its conclusion that an employee is protected by section 8(a)(3) from union caused
discipline even though the union was not motivated by considerations
of union membership or concerted activity. The Board's theory in this
case was similar to that announced in its Mountain Pacific decision: it
did not deal with the meaning of discrimination and it found improper
encouragement in the deronstration of union power. However, the
Miranda decision rested on a narrower base than the conclusions in the
Mountain Pacific and Pacific Intermountain Express cases that a delegation of arbitrary power to the union automatically constituted improper
encouragement. In Miranda the Board further limited itself by resting
on cases in which the union exercised its power in an unfair way,
113
thereby violating its duty of fair representation under section 9(a).
The court of appeals denied enforcement in an opinion by Judge
Medina. 114 The court held that to constitute "discrimination" within the
meaning of section 8(a)(3) the action taken had to be based on the affected
employee's union membership or activity. 115 If one accepts the court's
definition of discrimination it follows, as the court further concluded,
that union instigated conduct does not violate the act unless based upon
considerations which would be unlawful for the employer if he acted
independently. 1 6 But the court does not justify its definition and the
justification is not self evident. In Allis-Chalmers Co. v. NLRB 117 a violation was found when every member of a unit which voted union was
reclassified. The employer's action was held to discriminate against the
non-members who were reclassified although it was not based on their,
union membership or activity but on the behavior of other persons.
111 See, e.g., NLRB v. Great Falls Employers' Council, Inc., 277 F.2d 772 (9th Cir.
1960); NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1962).
112 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
113 The Board also differentiated this case from Mountain Pacific by pointing out
that the delegation of authority to the union in the Mountain Pacific case resulted in
economic benefits to both the employer and the union. No such benefits were involved
in Miranda. Chairman McCulloch and Board member Fanning dissented on the
ground that the right to fair representation was not included in section 7 and that
"the discrimination which §§ 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3) outlawed is that related to union
membership, loyalty, the acknowledgment of union authority or the performance of
union obligations." 140 N.L.R.B. at 197.
114 NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
115 Id. at 179.
116 Ibid. Judge Friendly dissented. He concluded that discrimination for purposes
of § 8(a)(3) meant "to differentiate without sufficient reason." Id. at 181.
117 162 F.2d 435 (7th Cir. 1947).
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Similarly in Miranda the employer's conduct was caused by union activity
although not by the union activity of the person harmed. It should be
noted that it is well settled that "the Act does not require that the employee discriminated against be the one encouraged for purpose of violation of section 8(a)(3)."1 18
The existence of the similarity does not prove that the decision in
Miranda should have followed that in Allis-Chalmers, but it does show
that the problem is one of policy rather than definition. And there is no
doubt that discrimination of the type involved in Miranda comes within
the policy of section 8(a)(3). The purpose of isolating an employee's job
from his decision as to whether or not to join a union is thwarted as
much when an employee learns that his job is threatened if he angers a
union official as when he learns that an employer is likely to take action
against him because of concerted activity or union affiliation. It is difficult
to see why employees would be more affected by the risks of concerted
activity in superseniority cases than by observing that the union has
power over their jobs. And there is no legitimate union interest in being
able to breach its duty of fair representation. If this standard can be
successfully applied under sections 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3) the union's legitimate sphere of operation will be left untouched.
There remains, however, a risk that in policing the duty of fair representation the Board, by failing to limit itself to ensuring that the union
acts in good faith, will interfere with necessary union discretion. The
decision in Miranda itself is not reassuring in this regard. The Board
was rather cavalier in concluding that the union breached its duty of
fair representation. As the court of appeals pointed out the Board did
not find that the union's contract interpretation was in bad faith. Wrhere
the union interprets a contract mistakenly but in good faith, to find a
violation is contrary to the Board's often stated policy of refusing to
police collective bargaining agreements. 119 The same considerations which
have led the Board to refuse to find an unfair labor practice where the
employer misreads and misapplies the collective bargaining agreement
should be applied to cases arising under sections 8(a)3 and 8(b)2. This
does not mean that the courts should reject the theory adopted by the
Board in Miranda. They should, however, insist that it be applied only
in cases in which the union officials in selecting people for disfavorable
treatment are motivated by such improper considerations as race, politi12 0
cal affiliation, or membership in a rival union or faction.
118 Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 51 n.2 (1954). See discussion of
Darlington Mill, text accompanying notes 69-79 supra.
119 See, e.g., In re Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943).
120 I do not think that the approach suggested by Judge Friendly is useful in this
regard. Judge Friendly would limit the sweep of the doctrine by defining discrimina-
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The unmistakable tendency in the courts and Congress is towards the
protection of the individual from the exercise of arbitrary power. This
trend is manifested in the encouragement of arbitration and the control
exercised over matters once deemed to be solely the union's internal
affairs. It is misleading to equate arbitrary union action with arbitrary
employer action and to say that since the act permits the one it should
not be read as outlawing the other: the act itself provides a mechanism
whereby collective bargaining may be required, and collective bargaining
agreements almost invariably involve setting limits on management's
ability to act arbitrarily. These limits are controlled in large part by the
union and thus give power to union officials to punish or reward. There
is no mechanism similar to collective bargaining for controlling arbitrary
union action unless the duty of fair representation is given real meaning
by the Board. 21 '
CONCLUSION

The Board has been faithful to the policy which gave rise to section
8(a)(3). In applying the section it has attempted to divorce union activity
from consequences on the job. Unfortunately the Board has often been
single minded in its pursuit of this goal. In many cases it has failed to
give adequate recognition to other important interests of employers and
unions. And often it has failed to articulate the basis for its decisions.
Partly as a result the courts have responded by unduly limiting application of section 8(a)(3). They have insisted upon a showing of improper
motive even where the employer admittedly used union activity as the
basis for his action. And the courts have not been willing to utilize section 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) as a way of protecting employees against arbitrary
union power. The confusion which surrounds application of section 8(a)(3)
can be resolved only if the Board shows a greater concern for and awareness of interests other than those protected by the act. Hopefully the
courts would then permit its application in situations where it is now
improperly denied.
tion as differentiation "without sufficient reason." Such discrimination may exist even
when the union acts in good faith. Moreover, to define discrimination as differentiation
without justification would be misleading and confusing as applied to situations such
as superseniority or no-solicitation rules. I would therefore approach the problem not
in terms of definition but of deciding which cases within the definition of § 8(a)(3)
are to be viewed as a violation. In this regard the Board's solution of limiting application of the section to cases in which the duty of fair representation is breached is
preferable to the approach stated by Judge Friendly.
121 The union's power in this regard has recently been strengthened by the decision
in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1964), which held that an employee
could not handle a grievance by himself but had to "afford the union an opportunity
to act on his behalf."

